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Abstract—Caching popular contents is a promising way to
offload the mobile data traffic in wireless networks, but so far
the potential advantage of caching in improving physical layer
security (PLS) is rarely considered. In this paper, we contribute
to the design and theoretical understanding of exploiting the
caching ability of users to improve the PLS in a wireless
heterogeneous network (HetNet). In such network, the base
station (BS) ensures the secrecy of communication by utilizing
some of the available power to transmit a pre-cached file, such
that only the eavesdropper’s channel is degraded. Accordingly,
the node locations of BSs, users and eavesdroppers are first
modeled as mutually independent poisson point processes (PPPs)
and the corresponding file access protocol is developed. We then
derive analytical expressions of two metrics, average secrecy
rate and secrecy coverage probability, for the proposed system.
Numerical results are provided to show the significant security
advantages of the proposed network and to characterize the
impact of network resource on the secrecy metrics.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the thriving development of mobile paying and internet
of things, the privacy and security of wireless communication
networks have become one of the most important issues. How-
ever, the broadcast nature of wireless channel leads to severe
security vulnerabilities such as eavesdropping and jamming
[1]. To overcome these shortages, physical layer security (PLS)
has emerged as a promising technology to complement and
augment the security of wireless networks.
In [2], Wyner shows that when the eavesdropping channel
is degraded than the main legitimating channel, the secrecy of
communication can be perfectly guaranteed at a non-zero rate.
And first, characterizes the maximal achievable secrecy rate as
‘secrecy capacity’ of the discrete wiretap channel. Further, var-
ious efficient approaches are proposed to improve the secrecy
capacity, e.g., artificial noise adding [3], and relay cooperating
[4]. By exploiting multi-input single-output techniques, [3]
proposes an artificial noise assisted beamforming scheme,
which imposes the artificial noise into the null space of the
legitimating channel to degrade the eavesdropping channel.
One source-destination pair with multiple relays intercepted by
multiple eavesdroppers (ERs) is considered in [4]. By deter-
mining the relay weights, the authors maximize the achievable
secrecy rate under different cooperating schemes.
With the popularization of and explosion of small commu-
nication equipments, the topology of the wireless network is
becoming densely and randomly, which intensifies the concern
for secure transmission. Based on poisson point process (PPP)
[5], [6]–[9] propose various schemes to improve physical layer
security in such wireless heterogeneous network (HetNet). In
[6], the authors consider two transmission strategies based
on sectoring and beamforming with artificial noise aided
and investigate the secrecy capacity of both schemes. By
exchanging the location information between BSs, [7] analysis
the effect of node locations on the achievable secrecy rate. In
[8], the authors develop a tractable framework to analysis the
average secrecy rate in a three-tier sensor network consisting
of sensors, access points and sinks. [9] confound ERs with
jamming signal from friendly jammers and artificial noise from
full-duplex user. By selecting the jammer selection threshold
to maximize secrecy probability.
Recently, caching popular contents at base station (BSs) and
users has been introduced as a promising technique to address
the mobile data tsunami in wireless networks [10], [11]. The
authors in [12] propose centralized and decentralized caching
algorithms to guarantee secret transmission rate by coded
multicast delivery. Further, [13] utilizes the cached files of
users as side information to cancel received interference from.
However, the potential of caching in improving physical layer
security is rarely considered until recently [14]. The authors
study the secure cooperative transmission among multiple
cache-enabled BSs with the shared video data. Under the
secrecy rate constraint, the total transmit power is minimized
by jointly optimizing caching and transmission policies.
In this paper, we propose a heuristic scheme to enhance
physical layer security in a cache-enabled HetNet by exploit-
ing the caching ability of users. Instead of sending Gaussian
noise as [3], [6], the BS transmits the target message combined
with an artificial interference which is a file pre-cached at
user. Since the cached file is known perfectly by the user, this
part of interference can be erased as [13] while [3] and [6]
need the orthogonal space of legitimating channel to isolate
noise. Meanwhile, ERs are confused by this part of artificial
interference due to absence of this file. Specifically, by using
stochastic geometry, we model the node locations (BSs, users
and ERs) of the three-tier HetNet as mutually independent
PPPs. The file access protocol is then proposed based on
whether the file is cached or not and whether the user has cache
ability or not. Accordingly, we derive analytical expressions of
average secrecy rate and secrecy coverage probability for the
proposed system in different transmission schemes. Numerical
results show that proposed scheme can achieve promising
performance in the both ER-dense and ER-sparse scenarios.
%DVH6WDWLRQ
&DFKH
&DFKHHQDEOHG8VHU
%DVH6WDWLRQ
&DFKHXQWHQDEOH8VHU
(DYHVGURSSHU

 

 








 

Base Station
 Cache-Enabled User
Normal Transmission
Eavesdropping

 



Secure Transmission
 Cache-Untenable User
Eavesdropper


Self-Offloading
(a)
(c)(b)
(c)
Fig. 1. System model of wireless cache-enabled heterogeneous networks
with eavesdroppers, where (a), (b) and (c) stand of Self-offloading, Secure-
transmission and Normal-transmission, respectively.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Network Structure
As shown in Fig. 1, we consider a general wireless cache-
enabled HetNet consisting three tiers of BSs, users and ERs,
where the locations of BSs, users and ERs in each tier are
spatially distributed based on independent PPPs, denoted as
Φb, Φu and Φe with density λb, λu and λe, respectively. All
nodes operate in single-antenna and we consider the downlink
transmission, where time is divided into discrete slots with
equal duration and we study one slot of the system. Large-
scale fading and small-scale fading are both considered. We
use d−β to denote large scale fading along the distance d,
where 2 6 β 6 4 is the path-loss exponent. For the small-
scale fading, we consider the Rayleigh fading channel h, i.e.,
|h |2∼ exp(1).
Consider a file library consisting of N files denoted by
F , {f1, f2, . . . , fN}, and all the files are assumed to have
equal length L. Each user randomly requests a file fi with
probability pi and
∑N
i=1 pi = 1. Without loss of generality
(w.l.o.g), we assume p1 ≥ p2 ≥ · · · ≥ pN . Here, we also
consider a file can only be stored entirely rather than partially.
Non-colluding ERs intercept information by passive listening
signal from BS.
We assume only α part of users have cache ability, where
0 ≤ α ≤ 1. The cache-enabled users also follow a thinning
PPP with density αλu. The cache-enabled users have same
caching size with (M × L)bits, where M < N and cache
the same M -most popular files out of F in this paper, which
are marked as set M , {f1, f2, . . . , fM}. To the aim of
tractability, we assume that BSs can access all the files in F
by directly connect to the core-network and neglect the extra
cost for BS to fetch files. The setM will be broadcasted to all
users by BSs at off-peak time then pre-stored at cache-enabled
users. ERs considered in this paper have no cache ability.
B. File Access Protocol
Let Q be the total amount of request from users in Φu at
one slot. As indicated in Fig. 1, the file access protocol can
be described as follows:
(a) Self-offloading: When a cache-enabled user happens
to request a file in M, the request will be satisfied
and offloaded immediately from the user’s local storage,
termed as “Self-offloading”. By denoting the cache hit
probability of the request fall inM as δ =∑Mi=1 pi, the
amount of this request is QSO = αδQ.
(b) Secure-transmission: When a cache-enabled user re-
quests fi (i > M ) from the complementary set F \M
which is denoted as C , {fM+1, fM+2, . . . , fN}, the
target file fi can be provided by the nearest BS. In
order to improve the transmission security, BS can
combine the target file fi with a cached file fm, i.e.,
fm ∈ M.1 Therefore, the transmission signal is ti =√
θPxi +
√
(1−θ)Pxm, where P is the transmission
power of BS, xi and xm are the signal of fi and fm with
E(|xi|2) = E(|xm|2) = 1 respectively, and θ ∈ (0, 1] is
the ratio of power allocation.
Since the pre-cached signal xm is known perfectly by
the cache-enabled user, the user can cancel the extra
interference xm. However, xm is unknown for the ERs
and thus can be viewed as a interference. We term this
transmission as “Secure-transmission”. And the amount
of this request is QST = α(1 − δ)Q
(c) Normal-transmission:When a user does not have cache
ability and requests fi from F , fi will be transmitted by
its nearest BS, termed as “Normal-transmission”. The
transmission signal is ti =
√
Pxi. Moreover, according
to which subset of fi belongs to, the request can be
divided into two types: fi ∈M and fi ∈ C. Therefore
the amount of these two types request are QNTM =
(1−α)δQ, QNTC=(1−α)(1− δ)Q, respectively.
In this paper, we assume all the BSs work in the full loaded
state due to λu ≫ λb and each BS randomly serve one of user
requests with equal probability. Therefore, the locations of BS
in different states {(b), (c)} are distributed as thinning PPPs
Φb1 ,Φb2 ,Φb3 with density λb1 =
QST
QST+QNT
λb =
α(1−δ)
1−αδ λb,
λb2 =
QNTM
QST+QNT
λb =
(1−α)δ
1−αδ λb and λb3 =
QNTC
QST+QNT
λb =
(1−α)(1−δ)
1−αδ λb respectively.
III. ANALYSIS OF TRANSMISSION PROTOCOL
According to Slivnyak’s theorem [15], a typical user u0
locating at the origin of the Euclidean area does not change the
distribution of PPP, no matter with or without caching ability.
We also consider that the link between u0 and its serving BS
b0 can be eavesdropped by all ERs in the network.
A. Normal Transmission
A typical user with no cache ability denoted as un0 requests
fi from F . The nearest BS b0 serves this request within the
normal-transmission. Since the interference signals transmitted
by other BSs from Φb1 ,Φb2 ,Φb3 cannot be cancelled without
cached files, the interference un0 suffering is equivalent com-
1W.l.o.g, we use f1 as fm in this paper which is noticed to all cache-
enabled users.
ing from {Φb\b0} with power P . Therefore the received signal
of un0 is
yun0=
√
Pd
− β2
un0,b0
hun0,b0xi+
∑
k∈{Φb\b0}
√
Pd
− β2
un0,bk
hun0,bkxk′+n0, (1)
where dun0,b0 denotes the distance between un0 and b0, hun0,b0
(hun0,bk ) represents the Rayleigh fading channel between un0
and b0 (bk), xi (xk′
2) is the transmission signal of b0 (bk), and
n0 ∼ CN (0, σ2) denotes the additive white Gaussian noise
(AWGN). W.l.o.g, the variance of AWGN noise ni is σ
2 for
i = 0, 1, 2, 3 in this paper.
Therefore the received signal-to-interference-plus-noise ra-
tio (SINR) at un0 is
SINRun0 =
Pd−βun0,b0|hun0,b0|2∑
k∈{Φb\b0}
Pd−βun0,bk|hun0,bk|2+σ2
. (2)
For the ER of un0, the received signal at an arbitrary ER
ej ∈ Φe is similarly given by:
yejn=
√
Pd
− β2
ej ,b0
hej,b0xi+
∑
k∈{Φb\b0}
√
Pd
− β2
ej ,bk
hej ,bkxk′+n1. (3)
Because xi is eavesdropped signal for ej , the SINR of ej
can be written as
SINRejn =
Pd−βej ,b0|hej ,b0|2∑
k∈{Φb\b0}
Pd−βej ,bk|hej ,bk|2+σ2
. (4)
B. Secure Transmission
A typical user with cache ability denoted as uc0 requests fi
from C. The nearest BS b0 will serve this request within the
secure-transmission. The received signal at uc0 is given by:
yuc0=
√
θPd
− β2
uc0,b0
huc0,b0xi +
√
(1− θ)Pd−
β
2
uc0,b0
huc0,b0xm
+
∑
j∈{Φb1\b0}
{√
θPd
− β2
uc0,bj
huc0,bjxj+
√
(1−θ)Pd−
β
2
uc0,bj
huc0,bjxm
}
+
∑
k∈Φb2
√
Pd
− β2
uc0,bk
huc0,bkxk+
∑
l∈Φb3
√
Pd
− β2
uc0,bl
huc0,blxl+ n2. (5)
As described in Section II-B, the pre-cached signal xm is
known perfectly at uc0. And assume that the perfect channel
state information (CSI) is fully available at cache-enabled
users. Therefore, the (1−θ) part of interference from Φb1 and
fully interference from Φb2 can be cancelled [13]. The SINR
of uc0 is
SINRuc0=
θPd−βuc0,b0|huc0,b0|2
θP
∑
j∈{Φb1\b0}
d−βuc0,bj|huc0,bj|2︸ ︷︷ ︸
IΦb1
+P
∑
l∈Φb3
d−βuc0,bl|huc0,bl|2︸ ︷︷ ︸
IΦb3
+σ2
.
(6)
2Note that xk′ include secure transmission and normal transmission from
BSs in {Φb\b0}.
For the ER of uc0, the received signal yejc is given by
yejc=
√
θPd
− β2
ej,b0
hej,b0xi+
√
(1−θ)Pd−
β
2
ej,b0
hej,b0xm
+
∑
k∈{Φb\b0}
√
Pd
− β2
ej,bk
hej,bkxk′+ n3, (7)
Thus the SINR of ej can be calculated as
SINRejc=
θP |hej ,b0|2d−βej ,b0
P
∑
k∈{Φb\b0}
d−βej ,bk|hej ,bk|2︸ ︷︷ ︸
IΦb
+(1−θ)Pd−βej,b0|hej ,b0|2+σ2
.
(8)
Remark 1. We can observe from (8) that the expression has
the form of θXC+(1−θ)X , where X=P |hej ,b0|2 d−βej ,b0 which is
a function of variables hej ,b0 and dej ,b0 , while C=PIΦb+σ
2
is not relevant. Therefore we have SINRejc ≤ θ1−θ , γth0 .
IV. SECURITY METRICS ANALYSIS
In this section, the secrecy performance of two transmission
protocols are compared in terms of average secrecy rate and
secrecy coverage probability.
A. Average Secrecy Rate
Consider a link between the user u0 and serving BS b0 being
intercepted by ER ∈ Φe. We focus on the most detrimental
ER which has the highest receive SINR from b0.
The instantaneous secrecy rate C is thus given as
C , ⌈Cu − Ce⌉†, (9)
where⌈x⌉† = max{x, 0}. Cu and Ce are, respectively, the
instantaneous capacity of the user’s (u0) channel and the most
detrimental ER’s channel, which can be expressed uniformly
as Ci = log2(1+γi), i = u, e. Here, γe is the instantaneous
received SINR of the most detrimental ER, which is given by
γe= max
ej∈Φe
{SINRej}. (10)
The average secrecy rate is defined as
C ,
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
⌈Cu− Ce⌉† dγudγe, (11)
and can be rewritten as [8]
C= 1
ln 2
∫ ∞
0
[
1−Fγu(γth)
]Fγe(γth)
1 + γth
dγth, (12)
where Fγu and (Fγe ) are the cumulative probability functions
(CDFs) of γu and (γe), respectively. Therefore, the C of two
transmission protocols are given as follow.
1) Secure Transmission:
Lemma 1. Let γuc be the SINR of the typical user with cache
ability, the CDF of γuc can be calculated as
Fγuc(γth)=1−2piλb
∫ ∞
0
xexp
{
−pix2[Z(γth)λb1+Z(γthθ )λb3+λb]
− σ
2
θP
γthx
β
}
dx, (13)
where Z(γth) = 2γthβ−2 2F1[1, 1− 2β ; 2− 2β ;−γth], 2F1[·] is the
Gauss hypergeometric function.
Proof. Please refer to Appendix A.
Lemma 2. Let γec be the SINR of the most detrimental ER of
the typical cache-enabled user, the CDF of γec is written as
Fγec(γth) =
{
F˜γec(γth) 0 ≤ γth ≤ γth0
1 else,
(14)
where F˜γec(γth) is
exp
{
−2piλe
∫ ∞
0
xexp
{
−piλbΓ(1+ 2
β
)Γ(1− 2
β
)
[
γthx
β
θ−(1−θ)γth
]
2
β
− σ
2
P
[ γthxβ
[θ −(1− θ)γth]
]}
dx
}
. (15)
and Γ[·] is the Gamma function.
Proof. Please refer to Appendix B.
Theorem 1. In the interference-limited scenario, the average
secrecy rate for the secure transmission is given by
CST = 1
ln 2
∫ γth0
0
exp
{
−λeλb
/
Γ(1+2β )Γ(1−2β )[ γthθ−(1−θ)γth ]
2
β
}
(1 + γth)[Z(γth)λb1λb +Z(
γth
θ )
λb3
λb
+1]
dγth
+
1
ln 2
∫ ∞
γth0
dγth
(1+γth)[Z(γth)λb1λb +Z(
γth
θ )
λb3
λb
+1]
. (16)
Proof. By substituting (13) and (14) into (12), it is easy to
obtain this theorem.
2) Normal Transmission:
Lemma 3. Let γun as the SINR of the typical user without
cache ability. Similar to (13), the CDF of γun is
Fγun(γth)=1−2piλb
∫ ∞
0
xexp
[
−piλbx2(Z(γth)+1)−σ
2
P
γthx
β
]
dx.
(17)
Lemma 4. Let γen as the SINR of the most detrimental ER
of the typical user without cache ability. Similar to (14), it is
easy to obtain the CDF of γen, which is given by
Fγen(γth)=exp
{
−2piλe
∫ ∞
0
xexp
{
−piλbΓ(1+ 2
β
)Γ(1− 2
β
)
[
γthx
β
] 2
β
− σ
2
P
γthx
β
}
dx
}
. (18)
Theorem 2. In the interference-limited scenario, the average
secrecy rate for the normal transmission is derived as
CNT= 1
ln 2
∫ ∞
0
exp
{
−λeλb
/
Γ(1+2β )Γ(1−2β )γth
2
β
}
(1 + γth)[Z(γth)+1] dγth. (19)
Proof. By substituting (17) and (18) into (12), we obtain this
theorem.
By comparing (16) and (19), we can find that CST and CNT
are both dependent on λe/λb, while CST is also dependent
on the power allocation ratio θ and the ratio of BS in three
different states λbi/λb, i = 1, 3. Note that λbi/λb, i = 1, 3,
are related to the cache-user ratio α and the cache hit ratio
δ. Numerical results will be given in Section V to show the
effects of these parameters.
B. Secrecy Coverage Probability
Let Rs be a given secrecy rate threshold. The delivery
is securely successful when the instantaneous secrecy rate C
is larger than the threshold Rs. Thus, the secrecy coverage
probability can be expressed as
P,Pr(C >Rs)=Pr [log2(1+γu)−log2(1+γe)>Rs]
= Eγu,γe
{
1[γu>(1+γe)2Rs−1]
}
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
(1+γe)2Rs−1
fγu(γ1)fγe(γ2) dγ1dγ2
=
∫ ∞
0
fγe(γth)
{
1−Fγu[2Rs(1+γth)−1]
}
dγth, (20)
where fγu(γu) and fγe(γe) are the probability distribution
functions (PDFs) of γu and γe, respectively.
Theorem 3. In the interference-limited scenario with the
secure transmission, the secrecy coverage probability is
PST =
∫ γth0
0
{exp[− λeλb/Γ(1+2β )Γ(1−2β )[ γthθ−(1−θ)γth ]2β]
G(γth)λb1λb +G(
γth
θ )
λb3
λb
+1
2λeθγ
− β+2
β
th
βλbΓ(1 +
2
β )Γ(1 − 2β )[ γthθ−(1−θ)γth ]
β−2
β
}
dγth, (21)
where G(γth) is given as
G(γth)=[(1+γth)2Rs−1]
2
β
∫ ∞
[(1+γth)2Rs−1]
2
β
1
1+x
β
2
dx. (22)
Proof. By differentiating (14) to get fγe(γe), then substituting
fγe(γe) and (13) into (20), we obtain this theorem.
Theorem 4. In the interference-limited scenario with the
normal transmission, the secrecy coverage probability is
PNT =
∫ ∞
0
{exp[− λeλb/Γ(1+2β )Γ(1−2β )γth2β]
G(γth) + 1
2λeγ
−β+2
β
th
βλbΓ(1 +
2
β)Γ(1 − 2β )
}
dγth (23)
Proof. By differentiating (18) to get fγe(γe), then substituting
fγe(γe) and (17) into (20), we get this theorem.
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V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, numerical results are provided to evaluate
the performance of the proposed transmission schemes. The
BSs, ERs and users are distributed based on PPPs with
density {λb, λe, λu} = {1, 5, 100}/km2 in the simulation. We
consider the transmission power P = 30 dBm and the noise
power σ2 = −174 dBm. We consider the path loss exponent
β = 4, the total number of files N = 100, the cache size
M = 5, the power allocation ratio θ = 0.5, and the cache user
ratio α = 0.5. In the simulation, the file popularity distribution
is modeled as Zipf distribution, i.e., the requested probability
of the i-th ranked file is given by pi =
1/iη
∑
N
j=1 1/j
η where η ≥ 0
characterizes the skew of the popularity distribution. We use
η = 0.8 in the simulation. These parameters will not change
unless specified otherwise.
In Fig.2, the average secrecy rate of the secure transmission
CST versus the power allocation ratio θ is illustrated. It can
be seen that there exists an optimal θ∗ to achieve the maximal
CST for a given α, and different α has different θ∗. As
presented in (16), CST cannot be expressed in a closed form.
As such, we cannot derive θ∗ in theory. We can observe
that the average secrecy rate CST first increase with θ when
θ ∈ (0, θ∗), then decreases with θ when θ ∈ (θ∗, 1). This
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interesting phenomenon can be well explained from (6) and
(8). The increase of θ improves the SINRs of both user and
ER, but the increment at user is dominant in (0, θ∗). When θ is
getting larger, the CST will be compromised due to the growing
effects of eavesdropping. We can also obtain that the secure
transmission can achieve better optimal C in larger α scenario,
because more secure transmissions occurs in the network.
In Fig.3, the average secrecy rate C versus the density ratio
of λeλb with different cache size M is illustrated. Note from
(19) that CNT is only depend on λeλb which is considered
as a baseline. We can see that with the increase of λeλb
,
the C is decreased for both with and without cache-enabled
transmission schemes, which indicates that more ERs cause
more serious eavesdropping. It should be highlighted that, even
with λeλb =10, the CST is still above 1.5 bits/s/Hz which only
reduced 25% from above 2 bits/s/Hz when λeλb = 0.1, while
CNT reduces to 0.3 bits/s/Hz from 2 bits/s/Hz, i.e., reduced
by 85%. In addition, we can also observe that the CST improves
with increasing cache size M , due to more interference signal
can be cancelled with larger ratio of Φb1 and Φb2 .
In Fig.4, the secrecy coverage probability P for various
λe
λb
is presented. We can observe that PST is much higher
than PNT for both λeλb = 5 and 0.5, which indicates the
promising effect of secure transmission in both ER-dense
scenario and ER-sparse scenario. Similar as Fig.3, we can also
see that more ERs cause more serious eavesdropping leading
lower secrecy coverage probability. The simulation results are
presented along with the theoretical ones in Fig.3 and Fig. 4.
We can see from the figures that the theoretical results are in
excellent agreement with the simulation results.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we reveal that the caching ability of users
can be used to improve the transmission security for physical
layer security in the wireless cache-enabled HetNet. The
corresponding secure transmission scheme is developed, where
the transmitter combines the message signal with the pre-
cached file. This scheme can introduce extra interference at
ER, but this interference can be cancelled at the cache-enabled
users. Based on stochastic geometry, we derive the expression
of average secrecy rate and secrecy coverage probability for
the secure transmission and the normal transmission. Finally,
we show that the secure transmission achieves a significant
security gain than the normal transmission.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 1
By replacing the distance du0,b0 between the typical user
and its nearest BS with x, the PDF of x is fX(x) =
2piλbx exp{−piλbx2} [5]. Then the CDF of γuc is derived as
Fγuc(γth),Pr [SINRuc ≤ γth]=Ex[SINRuc ≤ γth|du0,b0=x]
=
∫ +∞
0
Pr
[ θP |hu0,b0 |2x−β
θPIΦb1+ PIΦb3+σ
2
≤ γth
]
fX(x) dx
=
∫ +∞
0
Pr
[
|hu0,b0 |2≤γthxβ(IΦb1+
IΦb3
θ
+
σ2
θP
)
]
fX(x) dx
(a)
= 1−
∫ ∞
0
LIΦb1(γthx
β)LIΦb3(
γthx
β
θ
)e−
γthx
βσ2
θP fX(x) dx, (24)
where Step (a) follows from | hu0,b0 |2∼ exp(1). Under the
condition of du0,b0 = x, the remaining interferences resulted
from Φb1 and Φb3 are spatially located at the outside of
the circle centered at u0 with radius x denoted as C(u0,x).
Therefore the Laplace transform LIΦb1 is derived as
LIΦb1[γthx
β ] = EIΦb1
[
exp(−γthxβ
∑
j∈{Φb1\b0}
d−βu0,bj|hu0,bj|2)
]
= EIΦb1
{ ∏
j∈{Φb1\b0}
[
exp
(−γthxβd−βu0,bj|hu0,bj|2)]}
(a)
= exp
{
−λb1
∫
R2\C(u0,x)
[
1−E|hu0,bj |2(e−γthx
βr−β )
]
dr
}
(b)
= exp
[
−2piλb1
∫ ∞
x
v
1 + (γthxβ)−1vβ
dv
]
(c)
= exp
[−piλb1x2γ 2βth ∫ ∞
γ
−
2
β
th
dy
1 + y
β
2
]
= exp
[−piλb1x2Z(γth)], (25)
where step (a) follows from the probability generating func-
tional (PGFL) of PPP, step (b) is obtained by converting
the cartesian coordinates into polar coordinates, step (c) is
obtained by replacing (γthx
β)−
2
β v2 with y.
Similarly, the Laplace transform of the LIΦb3 is
LIΦb3
[γthxβ
θ
]
= EIΦb3
[
exp(−γthx
β
θ
∑
l∈Φb3
d−βu0,bl|hu0,bl|2)
]
= exp
[−piλb3x2Z(γthθ )]. (26)
By substituting (25), (26) into (24), we can obtain Lemma
1 and the proof is completed.
B. Proof of Lemma 2
Let us replace the distance dei,b0 with x. When γec ≤ γth0 ,
by substituting (8) into (10), the CDF of γec is
Fγec(γth) , Pr
{
max
ei∈Φe
[SINRei ≤ γth]
}
= Pr
{
max
ei∈Φe
[ θP |hei,b0|2 d−βei,b0
PIΦb+ σ
2+(1− θ)P |hei,b0|2d−βei,b0
≤ γth
]}
= EΦe
[∏
i∈Φe
Pr
( θP |hei,b0|2 d−βei,b0
PIΦb+ σ
2+(1−θ)P|hei,b0|2d−βei,b0
≤ γth
)]
(a)
= exp
{
−λe
∫
R2
1−Pr
[
|hei,b0|2≤
(PIΦb+σ
2)γthr
β
[θ −(1− θ)γth]P
]
dr
}
(b)
= exp
{
−2piλe
∫ ∞
0
xLIΦb
[ γthx β
[θ −(1− θ)γth]
]
e
−
σ2γthx
β
[θ−(1−θ)γth]P dx
}
(27)
where step (a) follows from the PGFL of PPP, step (b) is
obtained by converting the cartesian coordinates into polar
coordinates.
Note that the interference comes from {Φb\b0}, which is the
reduced Palm distribution of PPP Φb. According to Slivnyak-
Mecke theorem [16], the reduced Palm distribution of PPP
is equivalent of its original distribution, i.e.{Φb\b0} = Φb as
illustrated in [9]. Denoting S = γthx
β
[θ−(1−θ)γth]
, the Laplace
transform of interference IΦb (S) is derived as
LIΦb(S)= EIΦb
[
e
−SIΦb
]
= EIΦb
[
exp
(−S ∑
j∈{Φb\b0}
|hei,bj|2d−βei,bj
)]
(a)
= exp
{
−λb
∫
R2
1−E|hei,bj|2
[
exp
(−S |hei,bj|2d−βei,bj)]d(dei,bj )}
(b)
= exp
{
−2piλb
∫ ∞
0
v
1 + v
β
S
dv
}
= exp
[
−piλbΓ(1+ 2
β
)Γ(1− 2
β
)S
2
β
]
, (28)
where step (a) follows from the PGFL of PPP, where step
(b) is obtained by converting cartesian coordinates into polar
coordinates.
By substituting (28) into (27), we can get F˜γec(γth)as (15).
When γec is larger than γth0 , it is clearly to note that
Fγec(γth) = 1. Then the proof is completed.
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